



# PROFITABLE KEYWORD SEARCH OVER SCRAMBLED DATA IN CLOUD

GUNTU MADHAVI GOWRI NAGALAKSHMI<sup>1</sup>, Mrs. Y.YESUJYOTHI<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>PG Scholar, Dept of CSE, Srinivasa Institute of Engineering & Technology, Cheyyeru, Amalapuram-A.P, India

<sup>2</sup>Associate Professor, Dept of CSE, Srinivasa Institute of Engineering & Technology, Amalapuram-A.P, India

**Abstract-** Accessible encryption enables a cloud server to lead catchphrase look over scrambled information in the interest of the information clients without taking in the fundamental plaintexts. Be that as it may, most existing accessible encryption plots just help single or conjunctive watchword seek, while a couple of different plans that can perform expressive catchphrase look are computationally wasteful since they are worked from bilinear pairings over the composite-arrange gatherings. In this paper, we propose an expressive open key accessible encryption conspire in the prime-arrange gatherings, which permits watchword seek approaches (i.e., predicates, get to structures) to be communicated in conjunctive, disjunctive or any monotonic Boolean equations and accomplishes critical execution enhancement over existing plans. We formally characterize its security, and demonstrate that it is specifically secure in the standard model. Likewise, we actualize th proposed conspire utilizing a quick prototyping device called Charm, and lead a few examinations to assess it execution. The results show that our plan is significantly more productive than the ones worked over the composite-arrange gatherings.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Consider a cloud-based medicinal services data framework that has redistributed individual wellbeing records (PHRs) from different human services suppliers. The PHRs are encoded in request to follow security directions like HIPAA. In request to encourage information utilize and sharing, it is very attractive to have an accessible encryption (SE) conspire which permits the cloud specialist co-op to look over encoded PHRs for the benefit of the approved clients, (for example, restorative analysts or specialists) without learning data about the basic plaintext. Note that the setting we are thinking about underpins private information sharing among various information suppliers and various information clients. In this

way, SE plans in the private-key setting [1], [2], [3], which accept that a single client who seeks and recovers his/her own information, are not reasonable. Then again, private data recovery (PIR) conventions [4], [5], [6], which enable clients to recover a specific information thing from a database which openly stores information without uncovering the information thing to the database executive, are likewise not reasonable, since they require the information to be freely accessible. With the end goal to handle the watchword seek issue in the cloud-based medicinal services data framework situation, we depend on open key encryption with catchphrase look (PEKS) plans, which is right off the bat proposed in [7]. In a PEKS plot, a ciphertext of the watchwords called "PEKS ciphertext" is added to an encoded PHR. To recover all the encoded PHRs containing a watchword, say "Diabetes", a client sends a "trapdoor" related with a look question on the watchword "Diabetes" to the cloud benefit supplier, which chooses all the scrambled PHRs containing the catchphrase "Diabetes" and returns them to the client while without taking in the basic PHRs. Nonetheless, the arrangement in [7] and in addition other existing PEKS plans which enhance [7] just help correspondence inquiries [8]. Set crossing point and Meta keywords [9], [10] can be utilized for conjunctive catchphrase look. Be that as it may, the methodology in view of set crossing point releases additional data to the cloud server past the aftereffects of the conjunctive question, while the approach utilizing Meta catchphrases require 2m Meta watchwords to oblige all the conceivable conjunctive questions for m catchphrases. With the end goal to address the above inadequacies in conjunctive watchword look, plans, for example, the ones in [11], [12] were advanced in general society key setting. In a perfect world, in the viable applications, seek predicates (i.e., arrangements) ought to be expressive with the end goal that they can be communicated as combination, disjunction or any Boolean formulas<sup>2</sup> of watchwords. In this paper,



we propose an open key based expressive SE plot in prime-arrange gatherings, which is particularly reasonable for catchphrase look over encoded information in situations of various information proprietors and different information clients, for example, the cloud-based human services data framework that has redistributed PHRs from different social insurance suppliers.

## 2. OVERVIEW OF OUR PROPOSED SCHEME

The fundamental thought of our plan is to change a key-strategy credited based encryption (KP-ABE) plot built from bilinear blending over prime-arrange gatherings. Without loss of all inclusive statement, we will utilize the expansive universe KP-ABE plot specifically secure in the standard model. To start with, to protect catchphrase security in an entrance structure, we embrace the technique to separate every watchword into a nonexclusive name and a catchphrase esteem. Since catchphrase esteems are substantially more delicate than the conventional watchword names, the watchword esteems in an entrance structure are not revealed to the cloud server, though a halfway shrouded access structure with just nonexclusive catchphrase names is incorporated into a trapdoor and sent to the cloud server. We outfit this assigned server with an open and private key match of which people in general key will be utilized in trapdoor age to such an extent that it is computationally infeasible for anybody without learning of the protection key to get catchphrases data from the trapdoor. We propose the principal expressive SE plot in the general population key setting from bilinear pairings in prime request gatherings. In that capacity, our plan isn't just equipped for expressive multi-catchphrase seek, yet in addition essentially more effective than existing plans worked in composite-arrange gatherings. Utilizing an irregularity part system, our plan accomplishes security against disconnected watchword word reference speculating assaults to the ciphertexts. In addition, to protect the security of catchphrases against disconnected watchword word reference speculating assaults to trapdoors, we partition every catchphrase into watchword name and watchword esteem and allocate an assigned cloud server to lead look tasks in our development.

### 2.1 Contributions:

Notwithstanding concealing watchwords in cipher texts, we likewise need to safeguard catchphrase


protection in a trapdoor which contains an entrance structure as a segment. We formalize the security meaning of expressive SE, and formally demonstrate that our proposed expressive SE plot is specifically secure in the standard model. We execute our plan utilizing a quickly prototyping apparatus called Charm, and direct broad trials to assess its execution. Our outcomes affirm that the proposed plan is adequately proficient to be connected practically speaking.

## 3. RELATED WORK AND PROPOSED SYSTEM

Private-key Searchable Encryption. In a private-key SE setting, a client transfers its private information to a remote database furthermore, keeps the information private from the remote database chairman. Private-key SE enables the client to recover all the records containing a specific watchword from the remote database [1], [2], [3]. Notwithstanding, as the name recommends, private-key SE arrangements just apply to situations where information proprietors and information clients completely confided in one another. Private Information Retrieval. As for open database, for example, stock statements, where the client is ignorant of it and wishes to look for a few information thing without uncovering to the database director which thing it is, private data recovery (PIR) [4], [5], [6] conventions were presented, which enable a client to recover information from an open database with far littler correspondence then simply downloading the whole database. All things considered, in our specific circumstance, the database isn't freely accessible, the information isn't open, so the PIR arrangements can't be connected.

## 4 EFFICIENT AND EXPRESSIVE KEYWORD SEARCH WITH UNBOUNDED KEYWORDS

In this section, we describe the system model, design goals, threat model and algorithms of our expressive SE scheme.



The engineering of our watchword look framework is appeared in Fig. 1, which is made out of four substances: a trusted trapdoor age focus who distributes the framework parameter furthermore, holds an ace private key and is dependable for trapdoor age for the framework, information proprietors who redistribute encoded information to an open cloud, information clients who are special to inquiry and access encoded information, furthermore, an assigned cloud server who executes the catchphrase scan activities for information clients. To empower the cloud server to look over ciphertexts, the information proprietors affix each encoded record with scrambled keywords<sup>4</sup>. An information client issues a trapdoor ask for by sending a catchphrase get to structure to the trapdoor age focus which produces what's more, restores a trapdoor relating to the entrance structure. We expect that the trapdoor age focus has a different validation instrument to check every datum client and after that issue them the relating trapdoors. After acquiring a trapdoor, the information client sends the trapdoor and the relating halfway concealed access structure (i.e., the get to structure without watchword esteems) to the assigned cloud server. The last plays out the testing activities between each ciphertext and the trapdoor utilizing its private key, and advances the coordinating ciphertexts to the information client. As referenced before, a ciphertext made by an information proprietor comprises of two sections: the encoded archive created utilizing an encryption conspire and the encoded catchphrases produced utilizing our SE conspire. Starting now and into the foreseeable future, we as it were think about the last piece of the encoded report, and disregard the initial segment since it is out of the extent of this

paper. In synopsis, the plan objectives of our expressive SE plot are fourfold. Expressiveness. The proposed plan should bolster watchword get to structures communicated in any Boolean equation with and additionally doors.

Efficiency. The proposed plan ought to be satisfactorily productive as far as calculation, correspondence what's more, stockpiling for handy applications. Keyword protection. Initial, a ciphertext without its relating trapdoors ought not unveil any data about the watchword esteems it contains to the cloud server and pariahs. Second, a trapdoor ought not spill data on catchphrase esteems to any outside assailants without the private key of the assigned cloud server. We catch this idea of security for the SE plot regarding semantic security to guarantee that scrambled information does not uncover any data about the catchphrase esteems, which we call "particular indistinctness against picked watchword set assault (particular IND-CKA security)" (See Appendix A). Provable security. The security of the proposed plan ought to be formally demonstrated under the standard show instead of the casual investigation.

#### 4.1 Threat Model

We expect that the trapdoor age focus is a trusted substance. The cloud server is thought to be "straightforward butcurious", i.e., it will sincerely pursue the convention yet it is likewise inquisitive to take in any private data from the information put away in the cloud. Information proprietors are expected to sincerely store their information, while information clients are not trusted, and they can even plot with a threatening cloud server all together to find private data of different gatherings. We accept that the trusted trapdoor age focus is outfitted with a different confirmation instrument to check information clients before issuing trapdoors to clients. Additionally, we expect that all foes have limited computational ability, so they can't break the previously mentioned troublesome issues

#### 4.2 Correctness

If the keyword set  $W$  embedded in a ciphertext satisfies the access structure associated with the trapdoor, we will have



$$\begin{aligned}
 \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} v_i w_i &= \alpha. \text{ Therefore,} \\
 &\prod_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \left( \hat{e}(D, T_{i,1}) \hat{e}(D, \frac{T_{i,2}}{H(\hat{e}(T, T)^\gamma)}) \hat{e}(E_{i,1}, T_{i,3}) \right)^{w_i} \\
 &\quad \left( \hat{e}(E_{i,2}, T_{i,4}) \hat{e}(F_{i,1}, T_{i,5}) \hat{e}(F_{i,2}, T_{i,6}) \right)^{w_i} \\
 &= \prod_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \hat{e}(g^\mu, g^{v_i} w^{d_1 d_2 t_{i,1} + d_3 d_4 t_{i,2}})^{w_i} \\
 &\quad \cdot \hat{e}(w^{-\mu} (u^{W_i} h)^{z_i}, g^{d_1 d_2 t_{i,1} + d_3 d_4 t_{i,2}})^{w_i} \\
 &\quad \cdot \hat{e}(g_1^{z_i - s_{i,1}}, ((u^{W_{\rho(i)}} h)^{t_{i,1}})^{-d_2})^{w_i} \\
 &\quad \cdot \hat{e}(g_2^{s_{i,1}}, ((u^{W_{\rho(i)}} h)^{t_{i,1}})^{-d_1})^{w_i} \\
 &\quad \cdot \hat{e}(g_3^{z_i - s_{i,2}}, ((u^{W_{\rho(i)}} h)^{t_{i,2}})^{-d_4})^{w_i} \\
 &\quad \cdot \hat{e}(g_4^{s_{i,2}}, ((u^{W_{\rho(i)}} h)^{t_{i,2}})^{-d_3})^{w_i} \\
 &= \hat{e}(g, g)^\mu \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} v_i w_i = \hat{e}(g, g)^{\alpha \mu}
 \end{aligned}$$

### 4.3 Security Proof

**Theorem 1.** Under the decisional BDH assumption, the  $(q \square 2)$  assumption and the decisional linear assumption, our scheme is selectively indistinguishable under chosen keyword-set attacks (selective IND-CKA security). Proof. The details of the selective IND-CKA security definition and its proof are given in Appendix B. The proof is divided into two parts, depending on the role of the adversary. In the first part, the adversary is assumed to be an outside attacker, and in the second part, the adversary is assumed to be the cloud server who performs search operations.

## 5. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

In this section, we discuss the properties as well as extensions of our expressive SE scheme.

### 5.1 Keyword Privacy

**Keyword Value Guessing Attacks on Ciphertexts.** Below we briefly review the encryption algorithm of the KP-ABE scheme in [18], and then show that there exists a keyword value guessing attack if it is directly transformed into a searchable encryption scheme. With the end goal to counteract such assaults, in our development, we utilize a "straight part" procedure [20] on every catchphrase esteem related segment of the ciphertext, and afterward rerandomize the

segments upon every catchphrase esteem in the trapdoor. The previous advance counteracts watchword esteem speculating assaults to the ciphertext while the last advance permits the trapdoor to be utilized for testing catchphrase esteems in the ciphertext. Catchphrase Value Guessing Attacks on Trapdoors. Concerning this security necessity, we have to handle two issues in our development. In the first place, catchphrases related with a trapdoor must be avoided the entrance structure. We address this issue by isolating every watchword into a nonexclusive name and a catchphrase esteem, i.e., every watchword is i the type of "conventional name = watchword esteem", and an incomplete shrouded get to structure, i.e., the full access structure with catchphrase esteems being expelled (See Fig. 1) is joined in a trapdoor and given to the assigned cloud server. Second, the whole trapdoor ought to be safe to the disconnect watchword esteem speculating assaults [25]. In our SE framework,

### 5.2 Experimental Results

We actualize our plan in Charm [39]8, which is a system created to encourage quick prototyping of cryptographic plans and conventions. In view of the Python programming dialect, Charm empowers one to execute a cryptographic plan with not very many lines of code, essentially diminishing advancement time. In the mean time, computationally concentrated numerical tasks are executed with local modules, so the overhead because of Python in Charm is under 1%. Since all Charm schedules are structured under the lopsided gatherings, our development is changed to the unbalanced setting before the execution. That is, three gatherings  $G$ ,  $\wedge G$  and  $G1$  are utilized what's more, the blending  $\wedge e$  is a capacity from  $G \_ \wedge G$  to  $G1$ . Notice that it has been expressed in [18] that the presumptions and the security verifications can be changed over to the deviated setting conventionally. We utilize Charm of adaptation engage 0.43 and Python 3.4 i our execution. Alongside appeal 0.43, we introduce the most recent PBC library for fundamental cryptographic activities. Our trials keep running on an across the board work station with Intel Core i7-4785T CPU (4 center 2.20GHz) and 8GB Smash running 64-bit Ubuntu 15.10. The computational expenses of the Setup and sKeyGen calculations are clear, and we center around the computational expenses of the Trapdoor, Encrypt and Test calculations. In our investigations, an arrangement of catchphrases is produced, of which each watchword contains a conventional name, for



example, "Ailment", "Position", "Alliance" and a catchphrase esteem, for example, "Diabetes", "Specialist", and "City Hospital". For basic execution, we utilize whole numbers to indicate catchphrase values, e.g., a watchword as "Disease = 6" is communicated by "Sickness = Diabetes". Along these lines, we create an irregular set of catchphrases containing 10 to 50 watchwords, and utilize them to scramble 5,000 reports. We at that point expel the watchword values in the ciphertexts to such an extent that they contain just nonexclusive names of watchwords like "Ailment", "Position", as indicated in our solid development. From that point, we haphazardly pick 2 to 10 catchphrases to frame an arbitrary access structure. The quantity of catchphrases in a looking question is typically under 10, as indicated by the looking question logs of web indexes [41]. The arrangement tree is shaped with the end goal that for any inside hub the distinction on the hub number of its left branch and that of its privilege branch is under 2. We produce 50 diverse access arrangement trees, 10 for each extraordinary number of catchphrases, and make a trapdoor for every approach tree. We likewise expel the catchphrase esteem data from the trapdoors. So the approach tree in Fig. 3 demonstrates the computational overhead to produce trapdoors containing 2 catchphrases to 10 watchwords, from which we can see that the calculation time for the trapdoor age is relatively straight to the quantity of watchwords related with the entrance structure in the trapdoor. The MNT bends with higher security levels have longer calculation time, so MNT224 has higher calculation cost among all bends. The calculation time of SS512 is near that of MNT224 because of its higher exponentiation cost over G. The calculation time of creating a trapdoor with 10 catchphrases is 0.22s for MNT224, which is very unassuming for a ground-breaking trapdoor age focus.





Fig. 4 exhibits the calculation time for the Encrypt calculation more than 10 watchwords to 50 catchphrases. Obviously in our investigation, it demonstrates that the calculation time is around straight to the quantity of watchwords used to produce the ciphertext. The MNT bends with higher security levels are more costly in calculation cost, while the encryption cost of SS512 is substantially less than that of MNT bends. This is because of the way that  $(4m+1)$  exponentiations are done in  $G$  for the aggregate  $(7m + 2)$  exponentiations (see Table 3). To encode a record with 50 watchwords utilizing MNT224 bend, the calculation time is about 1.6s, which is adequate for generally applications.




**File Details:**



**Cloud Data Details**



**Search data Using Fuzzy Keyword:**



## 6 CONCLUSION

With the end goal to enable a cloud server to seek on scrambled information without taking in the hidden plaintexts in the publickey setting, Boneh [7] proposed a cryptographic crude called open key encryption with watchword look (PEKS). From that point forward, thinking about various prerequisites practically speaking, e.g., correspondence overhead, seeking criteria and security improvement, different sorts of accessible encryption frameworks have been advanced. Notwithstanding, there exist just a hardly any open key accessible encryption frameworks that help expressive catchphrase look arrangements, and they are altogether assembled from the wasteful composite-arrange bunches [17]. In this paper, we concentrated on the structure and examination of open key accessible encryption frameworks in the prime-arrange gatherings that can be utilized to look through various catchphrases in expressive seeking recipes. In light of an extensive universe key-approach characteristic based encryption conspire given in [18], we displayed an expressive accessible encryption framework in the primeorder gather which underpins expressive access structures communicated in any monotonic Boolean equations. Additionally, we demonstrated its security in the standard model, and broke down its proficiency utilizing PC recreations.

## 7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] O. Goldreich and R. Ostrovsky, "Software protection and simulation on oblivious RAMs," *J. ACM*, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 431–473, 1996.  
 [2] D. X. Song, D. Wagner, and A. Perrig, "Practical techniques for searches on encrypted data," in *2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, Berkeley, California, USA, May 14-17, 2000. IEEE Computer Society, 2000, pp. 44–55.

[3] E. Goh, "Secure indexes," *IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive*, vol. 2003, p. 216, 2003.

[4] C. Cachin, S. Micali, and M. Stadler, "Computationally private information retrieval with poly logarithmic communication," in *Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT '99*, International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, Prague, Czech Republic, May 2-6, 1999, Proceeding, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1592. Springer, 1999, pp. 402–414.

[5] G. D. Crescenzo, T. Malkin, and R. Ostrovsky, "Single database private information retrieval implies oblivious transfer," in *Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2000*, International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, Bruges, Belgium, May 14-18, 2000, Proceeding, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1807. Springer, 2000, pp. 122–138.

[6] W. Ogata and K. Kurosawa, "Oblivious keyword search," *J. Complexity*, vol. 20, no. 2-3, pp. 356–371, 004.

[7] D. Boneh, G. D. Crescenzo, R. Ostrovsky, and G. Persiano, "Publickey encryption with keyword search," in *Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 2004*, International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Interlaken, Switzerland, May 2-6, 2004, Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3027. Springer, 2004, pp. 506–522.

[8] J. Lai, X. Zhou, R. H. Deng, Y. Li, and K. Chen, "Expressive search on encrypted data," in *8th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS '13*, Hangzhou, China - May 08 - 10, 2013. ACM, 2013, pp. 243–252.

[9] P. Golle, J. Staddon, and B. R. Waters, "Secure conjunctive keyword search over encrypted data," in *Applied Cryptography and Network Security, Second International Conference, ACNS 2004*, Yellow Mountain, China, June 8-11, 2004, Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3089. Springer, 2004, pp. 31–45.

[10] D. J. Park, K. Kim, and P. J. Lee, "Public key encryption with conjunctive field keyword search," in *Information Security Applications, 5th International Workshop, WISA 2004*, Jeju Island, Korea, August 23-25, 2004, Revised Selected Papers, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3325. Springer, 2004, pp. 73–86.

[11] Y. H. Hwang and P. J. Lee, "Public key encryption with conjunctive keyword search and its extension to a multi-user system," in *Pairing-Based Cryptography - Pairing 2007*, First International



Conference, Tokyo, Japan, July 2-4, 2007, Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4575. Springer, 2007, pp. 2–22.

[12] B. Zhang and F. Zhang, “An efficient public key encryption with conjunctive-subset keywords search,” *J. Network and Computer Applications*, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 262–267, 2011.

[13] D. Boneh and B. Waters, “Conjunctive, subset, and range queries on encrypted data,” in *Theory of Cryptography, 4th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2007, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, February 21-24, 2007*, Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4392. Springer, 2007, pp. 535–554.

[14] Z. Lv, C. Hong, M. Zhang, and D. Feng, “Expressive and secure searchable encryption in the public key setting,” in *Information Security - 17th International Conference, ISC 2014, Hong Kong, China, October 12-14, 2014*. Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8783. Springer, 2014, pp. 364–376.

[15] J. Shi, J. Lai, Y. Li, R. H. Deng, and J. Weng, “Authorized keyword search on encrypted data,” in *Computer Security - ESORICS 2014 -19th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Wroclaw, Poland, September 7-11, 2014*. Proceedings, Part I, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8712. Springer, 2014, pp. 419–435.

[16] J. Katz, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Predicate encryption supporting disjunctions, polynomial equations, and inner products,” *J. Cryptology*, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 191–224, 2013.

Qualification is M.tech in C.S.E she has 7 years experience teaching in CSE and she has published 5+ papers on Various Streams.

#### **About authors:**



Guntu Madhavi Gowri nagalakshmi:- B.Tech in C.S.E from affiliated to J.N.T.U. Kakinada. She is pursuing M.Tech in the stream of C.S.E in, Srinivasa Institute of Engineering & Technology an affiliated to J.N.T University Kakinada, A.P, Cheyyeru (v),

Amalapuram.

#### **Guide:**



Mrs.Y.YESUJYOTHI:- Working as Associate Professor, Srinivasa Institute of Engineering & Technology an affiliated to J.N.T University Kakinada, A.P, Cheyyeru (v), Amalapuram-53322. Her